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THE RIDDLE UNDERLYING REFUSAL-TO-DEAL 
THEORY 
Michael Jacobs* and Alan Devlin** 
May a dominant firm refuse to share its intellectual property (IP) with 
its rivals?  This question lies at the heart of a highly divisive, international 
debate concerning the proper application of the antitrust laws.  In this short 
Essay, we consider a profound, yet previously unaddressed, incongruity un-
derlying the controversy.  Specifically, why is it that monopolists refuse to 
share their IP, even at monopoly prices?  To resolve this issue, some have 
recommended compulsory licensing, which would require monopolists to 
license their IP in certain circumstances.  This proposal, however, entails an 
inescapable contradiction, one rooted in the issue of monopolists‘ seeming-
ly inexplicable refusal to share their IP. 
The policy tensions implicated by the compulsory licensing debate are 
straightforward, involving a tradeoff between short- and long-term consid-
erations.  Assuming that the monopolist being targeted has not committed a 
separate violation of the antitrust laws,1 the near-term virtues of compulsory 
licensing are two-fold.  First, forced sharing will render the market more 
competitive in the short run.  Second, by increasing access to the relevant 
IP, the law may accelerate cumulative innovation and invent-around.  Both 
of these benefits seem reasonable, yet they portend a serious long-term cost: 
antitrust incursions into IP threaten to diminish incentives to invent. 
The tension between the long and short run moves the debate in a pre-
dictable but inconclusive direction.  Consider, for example, the differences 
between the U.S. and European approaches to compulsory licensing.  
Courts in the United States have ruled that monopolists may refuse for al-
most any reason to license their IP to a rival, reasoning that the long-term 
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  If the monopolist has infringed the competition laws through unrelated conduct, see, e.g., United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (link), compulsory licensing might be an appro-
priate remedy. 
2
  See, e.g., Verizon Commc‘ns. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407–16 
(2004) (link); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325–28 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (link); 
Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1215 (9th Cir. 1997) (link). 
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European Court of First Instance has ruled that compulsory licensing is ap-
propriate when necessary to bring ―viable‖ competition to uncompetitive 
markets, choosing to discount (or ignore) the long-term incentive effects.3 
A secondary argument, but an important one nonetheless, also follows 
predictable lines.  U.S. courts are skeptical about the ability of regulatory 
bodies or judges to determine, over time and changing circumstances, the 
proper fee and other terms of a compulsory license.  They believe that em-
broiling agencies or judges in the details of writing and interpreting ongoing 
licensing agreements will generate large costs with little or no commensu-
rate benefit.  Instead, they regard the market as the best mechanism for or-
ganizing transactions and setting prices.4  Their European counterparts, 
more confident about the abilities of regulatory regimes and less trustful of 
market mechanisms, believe otherwise.  They would thus entrust those 
complicated tasks to judges and administrative agencies.5 
This debate over compulsory licensing is remarkable, and for good rea-
son.  Its very existence illustrates deep and seemingly unbridgeable rifts be-
tween the U.S. and European competition regimes regarding the proper 
application of basic elements of antitrust law and economics.  Its indetermi-
nacy—there is no answer to the critical question whether the short-term 
benefits of compulsory licensing exceed the long-term costs of reduced in-
centives to innovate—provides a vivid demonstration of the limits of eco-
nomic analysis.  And its resolution in the respective jurisdictions bears 
witness to the important role of culture and history in providing a basis for 
decision-making when the explanatory power of economics is of no avail. 
We have written about this elsewhere and will not rehearse it here.6  
Instead, we consider perhaps the single most remarkable feature underlying 
the debate: the decision of the dominant firm to refuse to license its IP.  
This refusal would appear to be a business mystery of sorts.  If the goal of 
every business is to reach the point where it can maximize profit by charg-
ing monopoly prices,7 as would certainly seem to be the case, then why 
would a dominant firm ever refuse—completely refuse—to license its valu-
able IP to rivals?  Why would it not offer to license at the monopoly price?  
Why would cases arise in which a dominant firm refuses even to name a 
price at which it would license its IP to rivals? 
There are risks, after all, in refusing to license.  Granting a license at 
the monopoly price would ensure for a time the rival‘s use, and the mar-
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  See Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Divergence and the Limits of Economics, 104 NW. 
U. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2010) (link). 
7
  See Verizon, 540 U.S. at 407 (explaining that ―[t]he opportunity to charge monopoly prices . . . is 
what attracts ‗business acumen‘ in the first place‖). 
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would certainly pose risks for the dominant firm—for example, the rival 
might improve on the technology—but contract (license) terms could mi-
nimize or eliminate most of those risks.  On the other hand, a refusal to li-
cense at any price, while harming the rival in the short-term, or maybe even 
eliminating it, would compel the next generation of inventors to invent 
around the dominant product.  If they succeeded, their new technology 
would leap-frog the dominant firm‘s IP, and might thus (depending on 
switching costs) make that IP obsolete in the next term.  Licensing now at 
the monopoly price could forestall that later leap-frog invention and extend 
the life of the dominant firm‘s market power.  Why not license it, then? 
There are at least two potential answers to this question.  First, the do-
minant firm might lack the information needed to determine the monopoly 
price.  Perhaps the IP has great value now in certain markets or applica-
tions, but may have even greater value in other markets or applications not 
yet identified.  A license at today‘s monopoly price might not fully capture 
tomorrow‘s value, allowing one‘s rival to profit in those yet-to-be-identified 
markets and encouraging it to identify those markets for itself, thus gaining 
a first-mover advantage in them.  Nor would it necessarily be a simple mat-
ter to contract around this problem.  Contract is an imperfect vehicle, incap-
able of adequately specifying solutions to all potential problems that might 
arise during its term.  In addition, contracting costs might be high.  And, of 
course, the terms needed to prevent the rival from using the IP to create or 
discover a profitable new market—or requiring it to share that market with 
the licensor—might create legal risks of their own.8 
Second, if the dominant firm is able to determine the monopoly price 
and assess the relevant costs, it might conclude that the costs outweigh the 
benefits and that agreeing to license would not therefore be the profit-
maximizing strategy.9  Alternatively, the firm might not know the ―correct‖ 
price, but might know that the pertinent costs are high.  Or, knowing neither 
the price nor the costs, it might fear that high costs could swamp the profit-





  For instance, exclusive grantback provisions in patent licenses, by which licensees are compelled 
to assign back to the licensor any improvement patents, may run afoul of the antitrust laws.  See, e.g., 
Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 646–48 (1947) (link).  More gen-
erally, market-sharing agreements, even within the scope of a patent, are subject to antitrust scrutiny.  
See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 604 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam) (link). 
9
  One possibility is that the relevant IP is of greater value to the inventing monopolist than it would 
be to its rivals due to the endowment effect.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 112 (2002).  This cognitive bias, which might lead monopolists to place an artifi-
cially elevated value on their IP, causes dominant firms to refuse to license at what would be deemed a 
―monopoly‖ price by the larger market.  On that basis, one might contend, a regulator or court may im-
prove social welfare by compelling access at a ―market‖ rate.  Notwithstanding monopolists‘ potential 
failure to act as rational actors, a ―market‖ price—so defined—will under-compensate the inventor.  
Subjective value, as Judge Posner has pointed out, is an important economic criterion.  See RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 55–58 (2003). 
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These conclusions yield an important insight.  On any of these premis-
es, the dominant firm should be free to refrain from licensing, not because 
its freedom is an important antitrust value in itself, but because no regulato-
ry authority or judicial decree could create a licensing agreement that would 
plausibly offer to improve social welfare.  This conclusion follows from the 
assumptions that the dominant firm is a self-interested profit-maximizer: 
that it has every incentive to identify the monopoly price and the costs—
transactional, legal, and otherwise—of a licensing arrangement; and that 
when it either cannot adequately identify those factors, or identifies them 
and concludes that licensing is ill-advised, its conclusion is bound to be su-
perior to any different conclusion that an agency or court might reach. 
